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Abstract
Does legal insider trading contribute to market efficiency? Using the refinement proposed by 
the recent microstructure literature, we analyze the information content of legal insider 
trading. Our sample encompasses 2,110 different companies subject to 59,244 aggregated 
daily insider trades over the period from January 1995 to the end of September 1999. Our 
main findings are the followings. (i) Consistent with previous literature, financial markets 
offer a mild response in terms of abnormal returns to insider trading activities. (ii) The 
univariate analysis of stock prices on insider net purchase and net sale days suggests insiders’ 
market timing ability. (iii) Market liquidity seems to be weaker on insider net purchase days, 
indicating that net buyer insiders are on average market liquidity consumers. (iv) Market 
liquidity seems to be higher on insider net sale days, indicating that net seller insiders are on 
average market liquidity providers. (v) The analysis of the considered information proxy 
reveals that insiders enhance market efficiency. Insider trading clearly permits faster price 
discovery on insider trading days. (JEL G14; G18) 
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“Our markets are a success precisely because Americans enjoy the world’s highest level of confidence. 
[…] Investors trust that the marketplace is honest. They know that our securities laws require free, fair 
and open transactions.” 
Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC 
Address before the “SEC speaks” Conference, February 1998 
Does legal insider trading contributes to market efficiency? In this paper, using the 
refinement proposed by the recent microstructure literature, we propose to analyze the 
information content of legal insider trading. This is an important question since insider 
trading regulation plays an important role in economies with developed stock markets. 
According to Battacharchya and Daouk (2002), the existence of insider trading laws 
and their enforcement is essentially a phenomenon of the 1990s. One interesting 
aspect of these regulations is that they allow insiders to trade their own companies’ 
stocks under certain conditions. For example, under US securities laws, legal insider 
trading occurs every day when corporate insiders – officers, directors or employees – 
buy or sell stock in their own companies.1
The social utility of regulating insiders’ trading has been deeply debated in the 
literature. Indeed, there are several important contributions which analyze the impact 
of insider trading and its regulation on economic efficiency. On the one hand, critique 
of insider trading regulation argues that restrictions are inefficient because insider 
trading allows new private information to be priced more quickly. Stock prices, 
therefore, reflect intrinsic firm value more accurately, promoting improved economic 
decision-making and resource allocation (e.g., Manne, 1966; Carlton and Fischel, 
1983; Glosten, 1989; Manove, 1989; Leland, 1992). Moreover, Tighe and Michener 
(1994) argue that merely private interests are served by insider trading laws (e.g., 
1 One of the constraints is that the insiders have to report their trading to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Once the trading is completed, files have to be sent to the SEC, which publishes 
them. 
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brokers, arbitrageurs and portfolio managers), as small investors lack the political 
organization to lobby for such laws. On the other hand, those in favor of insider 
trading regulation essentially claim that regulation promotes public confidence and 
participation in the stock market and allows outsiders to share in value-enhancing 
events on an equal footing (Ausubel, 1990).
One clear message which arises from this intensive debate is that authorizing insiders 
to trade should be based on a balance between allowing private information to be 
priced (enhancing market efficiency) and preserving market integrity (avoiding unfair 
enrichment by those with access to privileged information). As pointed out by 
Huddart et al. (2001), the regulatory objectives of public disclosure of insider trading 
are to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. However, 
there is always a delay between the realization of insider trading and public 
announcement of this.2 Therefore, to fully justify regulated insider trading, we need, 
in return, a contribution to market efficiency.  
Consequently, the research question we are interested in is the following: do legal 
insider trading activities contribute to market efficiency? In other words, does 
information affect prices more quickly thanks to legal insider trading activities? This 
is an essential question because previous studies, using mainly portfolio approaches, 
document that insiders outperform the market over a time horizon ranging from one 
month to several months (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; Seyhun, 1986 and 1998; 
2 In the United States, according to Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders 
are required to report their transactions by the tenth day of the calendar month after the trading month. 
In our sample, the average reported period is around 22 days. It is important to note that since August 
2002, according to the Section 403(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, insiders are required to 
report their transactions before the end of the second business day following the day on which the 
subject transaction has been executed. 
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Lin and Howe, 1990; Jeng et al., 2003).3 Are these abnormal gains really evidence of 
private information revelation by the action of better-informed agents? We see at least 
another two competing explanations. First, these abnormal gains could be the 
manifestation of some latent risk factors such as size, earnings/price or book-to-
market (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman, 1988; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). The second 
possible explanation is that these abnormal returns, since they are computed over an 
event window of several months, could reflect the price reaction to subsequent public 
announcement (within the event window) of previously private information. 
Therefore, it is still questionable whether insiders contribute to faster price discovery. 
Moreover, these portfolio approaches are subject to significant bad-model problems, 
which are even more serious for long-term returns analysis (see comments of Fama 
(1998) about long-term event studies). 
The relevance of our research question stems also from the fact that (informed) insider 
trading profit is realized at the expense of outside investors, even if total welfare may 
increase or decrease depending on the economic environment (Leland, 1992). 
Moreover, we do not have a clear-cut answer from the literature as to whether 
outsiders can profit by using the publicly available information concerning insider 
trading once they are reported to the SEC (e.g., Seyhun, 1986; Rozeff and Zaman, 
1988).4 Therefore, the necessary condition that needs to be satisfied in order to justify 
allowing insiders to trade on their private information is that their trading should 
enhance market efficiency. This is what we propose to test in this paper. 
3 However, there is a notable exception to this general finding, which is the study by Eckbo and Smith 
(1998). They report that insiders in firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange do not earn abnormal profits. 
4 However, Seyhun (1992) provides evidence that insider trading has some predictive ability of future 
stock returns. In the same way, Bettis et al. (1997) show that outside investors can earn abnormal 
profits by analyzing publicly available information about large insider trades by top executives. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) report also that insiders seem to be able to predict cross-sectional stock 
returns. Their result, however, is driven by insiders’ ability to predict returns in smaller firms. 
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To address this question, we use an extensive U.S. database of legal trading realized 
by insiders covering the period from January 1995 to the end of September 1999. Our 
sample includes 59,244 aggregated insider open market episodes. Previous studies 
mostly look at what is happening ex post to insider trading in terms of abnormal gains 
for insiders and/or outsiders (portfolio performance), while we are more interested in 
what is happening on insider trading days in terms of price discovery. Our focus on 
the short-term impact of insiders’ trading activities to capture information effects is 
motivated by recent evidence presented by Chordia et al. (2005). These authors show 
that it takes only five minutes for astute investors to begin efficiency-creating actions. 
It is also important to note that there are some studies that appraise the impact of 
insider trading activities over a shorter period. Seyhun (1986), and more recently 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) provide short-term event study results on US legal insider 
trading. They observe statistically significant, but economically unimportant market 
movements around insider net purchases and net sales.5 Using the same event study 
method, we confirm this result with our sample of insider trades. Recently, within the 
UK context, Fidrmuc et al. (2006) report abnormal returns which is three times as 
high as the one provided by Lakonishok and Lee (2001).6 Jenter (2005) interprets the 
lack of evidence for economically significant insider abnormal returns as that the 
corporate insiders in US may not use much valid inside information.7
5 Note that the statistical significance of this result is subject to active debate in the literature (see e.g. 
Buttler et al., 2005; Baker et al., 2006). 
6 One possible explanation provided by the authors is the speedier reporting of trades in the UK 
compared to the US. 
7 However, it is important to note that the small returns associated with insider trades could be 
considered as economically significant given these trades combine transactions that are uninformative 
and others that do contain information. 
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But aside from the debate about the economic significance of the abnormal return 
around insider trading days, its use to infer insiders’ information-motivated trading 
seems to be subject at least to two shortcomings. The first one is related to the likely 
endogenous relation between the abnormal returns and insider trading. The insiders 
can decide to purchase on a specific day because they expect that stock prices will 
increase on that day. The second shortcoming is related to the fact that the abnormal 
returns could be a noisy proxy for private information, essentially because insiders 
can act also strategically by timing the market, and choosing voluntarily a trading 
window in which they can hide their trading motivation (see, Jenter, 2005, and 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2005). For example, the insider may submit a buying trade 
when the price is declining. Hence, the resulting abnormal return would be an 
underestimation (overestimation) for the purchases (sales) of the true abnormal return. 
In such a context, the abnormal return for a given insider trading day could be the sum 
of at least two effects: (1) the price impact of the private information, and (2) the 
market timing of the insider.  
To sum up, on the one hand, if we consider that the abnormal returns generated on 
insider trading days are economically important, we are not sure about the direction of 
the causation. On the other hand, if we think that the abnormal returns are too small to 
be economically significant, we are left with a puzzling result. These two phenomena 
are likely to be present and to compensate each other on a large sample of insider 
trades.
Our contribution to the literature lies in the fact that our study is built on an improved 
measure of information incorporation, grounded in recent market microstructure 
literature and permitting the study of insider purchase and sale activities on a large 
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sample of (even low liquid) firms (and insiders’ transactions). Our approach is close 
to the one of Chordia et al. (2005) in the sense that we measure the “contribution to 
market efficiency” by using the contemporaneous relationship between the return and 
the relative order imbalance. Moreover, focusing on the trading mechanism (the price 
impact of the relative order imbalance) allows us to analyze insider purchases as well 
sales and to overcome the two shortcomings affecting the abnormal return approach 
identified here above. The abnormal price sensitivity to relative order imbalance due 
to insider trades is without ambiguity a consequence of their trading behavior.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. We compute the abnormal returns 
associated to insider net purchases and net sales in order to replicate the Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) results. This is just to ensure that we are in the same empirical 
context. Our univariate analysis highlights insiders’ market timing ability. Stock 
prices on insider net purchase (sale) days tend to be smaller (greater) than the ones on 
the other days. Market liquidity seems to be weaker on insider net purchase days, 
suggesting that insiders are on average market liquidity consumers. But in return, they 
enhance market efficiency, because insider abnormal purchases are associated with 
faster price discovery. That is, the association between the relative order imbalance 
and market return is larger on days on which insiders are net purchasers. With respect 
to insider sales, market liquidity seems to be greater on insider net sale days, 
suggesting that insiders on average are market liquidity providers. Moreover, the 
sensitivity of the return on the relative order imbalance is higher in absolute value, 
which indicates that insider abnormal selling activities also clearly permit faster price 
discovery.
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This paper is closely related to the work of Damodaran and Liu (1993) where the 
authors identify an experimental context where it is possible to isolate the presence of 
private information and to value its economic content. Focusing on a very small 
sample of insider trades8, they provide evidence of private information revelation 
through the trading of corporate insiders of real estate investment trusts following 
their company assets’ appraisals. Insiders seem to believe on this reevaluation, and 
trade on it to make profit, and in the process reveal their information to the market. 
The later public disclosure of the reevaluation is not associated with significant 
market reaction. It is important to note that, in addition to the small sample size of 
their study, the authors do not provide a clear distinction between the insider trades 
analyzed and the concept of illegal insider trading.9 Our work can be seen as a 
generalization of the finding of Damodaran and Liu (1993) on a large sample of 
insider trades, while focusing on legal insider trading without having any knowledge 
of the existence of private information.  
There are also other papers that provide indirect evidence that the stock market 
responds quickly to insider trades. For example, Jeng (1999) and Bettis et al. (2000)
analyze the trading rates and information asymmetry measure on blackout period (a 
period on which companies restrict trading in their stock by their own insiders). They 
document that trading rates are much higher during allowed trading days and that the 
adverse-selection component of the spread is higher as well during those days on 
which the probability of insider trades is relatively high.
8 Their sample encompasses only 35 transactions (23 purchases and 12 sales) in a 6-month period 
before the appraisal, and 45 transactions (40 purchases and 5 sales) between the appraisal month and its 
public disclosure. 
9 With respect to illegal insider trading, there are several contributions in the literature that show the 
incorporation of information into asset prices around days of the illegal trades (see, a.o, Battacharya et
al., 2000). 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the methodology adopted to 
measure the contribution of legal insider trading to market efficiency. Section 2 
describes the data. Section 3 presents our analysis of how legal insider trading 
activities contribute to market efficiency. Section 4 concludes. 
1. Measuring “the Contribution to Market Efficiency” 
The recent microstructure literature proposes three main approaches for measuring 
information-based trading. The first one is based on spread and on its adverse 
selection component. This method is subject to serious criticism in the literature, 
mainly related to the fact that competing spread decomposition models seem to 
provide different results (Van Ness et al., 2001; Neal and Wheatley, 1998).
Another widely used approach to measure information-based trading is the permanent 
price impact measure originated by Hasbrouck (1991a; 1991b). Here the theory is that 
the more informative trading is, the bigger its permanent price impact should be. By 
the use of a vector autoregressive model, Hasbrouck models the dynamic between the 
price changes and the order flow (through the trading). By assuming that it is the 
unexpected part of the order flow which incorporates private information, Hasbrouck 
computes the permanent (long-term) price impact of such trading and uses it as an 
indicator of information based-trading. While this method is clearly attractive, its 
major empirical shortcoming is the need for a large amount of observations. Vector 
autoregressive models require a large amount of high-frequency data to be estimated, 
which limits in practice the applicability of the method to actively traded stocks. This 
weakness is not, in our case, without consequences. We may indeed expect that 
insider trading activities impact more strongly on the speed of the price discovery 
process for low liquid stocks.
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The last important microstructure-based information asymmetry measure is the 
probability of information-based (PIN) trading introduced by Easley et al. (1996). 
This measure is based on a structural sequential trade model, and has led to numerous 
applications in empirical finance. Its widespread use most likely originates from the 
structural model on which it is based as well as from its appealing empirical 
tractability. Only classified trades (buyer or seller initiated) are needed. However, its 
information content is not clear enough. This model simply argues that the likely 
reason for a discrepancy (if any) between buyer and seller initiated trading is the 
trading activity of informed traders. Aktas et al. (forthcoming Journal of Financial 
Markets) underline the limits of such a conjecture, analyzing the PIN behavior around 
M&A announcements. 
To analyze whether insider trades are information-motivated, we develop an 
alternative approach, designed to tackle the limitation of the above-mentioned 
approaches. Aktas et al. (forthcoming Journal of Financial Markets) have shown that 
PIN is simply trade imbalance statistics. Indeed, PIN corresponds to the ratio between 
the expected absolute order imbalance (absolute difference between buys and sells, 
namely OIB) and the expected volume. The daily PIN can be proxied empirically by 
the daily relative order imbalance, the ratio between the daily imbalance and the daily 
volume. Starting from this observation, our approach is based on ideas developed in 
Hasbrouck (1991a; 1991b), Chordia et al. (2005), and Aktas et al. (forthcoming 
Journal of Financial Markets). We measure the “contribution to market efficiency” 
by estimating the contemporaneous correlation between daily return and daily relative 
OIB. Only the component of the relative order imbalance that has an impact on the 
return is expected to convey valuable information. Its uncorrelated part is most likely 
driven by liquidity motivated trading. This is because we know that order imbalances 
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arise either from traders who believe themselves to be in the possession of pertinent 
information, or from traders who experience large liquidity shocks (Chordia et al.,
2002). In order to disentangle these two components, we study within a panel 
regression framework the correlation between the daily return and our private 
information measure. 
More specifically, for each one of our sample securities and for each trading day, 
using intraday quote and transaction data, we measure the signed relative OIB (ROIB)
for day t and stock i as follow: 
? ? ? ?tititititi SBSBROIB ,,,,, ??? ,       (1) 
where BBi,t and Si,t correspond to the number of buys and sells for day t and stock i,
respectively. We also use two alternative specifications for the ROIB: the volume
ROIB, where B and S are expressed in the number of shares exchanged, and the value 
ROIB, where B and S are the buy and sell volumes in monetary value. The first 
measure of ROIB ignores the size of the trade, counting small orders in the same way 
as large orders. The volume and value ROIB weights large orders more heavily.  
Since only the component of the ROIB that generates a price impact is expected to 
signal private information, in a second step we analyze within a panel regression 
framework the sensitivity of the daily return to the daily ROIB computed using 
intraday transaction data. This is given by the following equation: 
i,ttiiti ?ROIBR ??? ,, ?? .        (2) 
The coefficient ? measures the normal level of the price sensitivity to the ROIB. Our 
aim is to measure the impact of insider trades on this coefficient, which would 
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correspond to the abnormal change in sensitivity due to insider trading. The intuition 
underlying our test is summarized in Figure 1. The coefficients ?BUY and ?SELL capture 
the abnormal change in the sensitivity induced by insider buy and sell transactions, 
respectively. If insider trades are information-motivated, insider purchases should 
increase the price sensitivity to a positive order imbalance (Panel A), and decrease the 
price sensitivity to a negative order imbalance (Panel B). In this latter case, 
information-motivated insider purchases would attenuate the sell order imbalances of 
others. Indeed, if ROIB is positive, then its coefficient should be larger on days when 
insiders purchase too, but when ROIB is negative, the price sensitivity to order 
imbalance on insider purchase days should be smaller in absolute value than the price 
sensitivity on the other days. The reasoning is the same for insider sells.  
To capture the asymmetric relationship between the return and the interaction of the 
ROIB and insider trades, we consider the ROIB in absolute value, and estimate the 
following general equation within a panel framework10:
? ? ? ? i,ti,ti,tSELLi,ti,tBUYtiiti ? ISELLROIB  IBUYROIB ROIBR ??????? ???? ,, , (3) 
where IBUYi,t (ISELLi,t) corresponds to the ratio of the net insider purchases (sales) on day 
t to the total volume of that day for stock i, and i,tROIB  is the relative order imbalance in 
absolute value. To validate our “efficiency-creating actions by insiders” hypothesis, 
the coefficient ?BUY (?SELL) should be positive (negative) and statistically significant 
for insider purchases (sales). Once controlled for the general relation between the 
return and the ROIB, this result indicates that the ROIB observed on insider purchase 
(sale) days impacts marginally more on the return than on other days, and this is 
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attributed to differential incorporation of information into price occasioned by insider 
purchases (sales). Such a result is only compatible with information incorporation into 
prices on insider trading days. Moreover, the use of a fixed-effect panel regression 
approach allows us to control for omitted variables (e.g., firm characteristics) that are 
constant through time.  
To conclude this section, we want to stress that the biases potentially affecting the 
abnormal return as a proxy of information incorporation into price (the causation 
problem and the strategic behavior of informed investors) are less likely to affect our 
approach. This is because our measure captures something that is specific to the 
functioning of the market, which is the speed of convergence to market efficiency. 
This dimension is less subject to manipulation/strategic actions by insiders. What we 
really want to do is to assess empirically whether insiders bring new and useful 
information into asset prices with their trading activities, controlling as much as 
possible for other impacts.  
2. Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
2.1. Trade, quote and imbalance data 
Trade and quote data come from the NYSE’s TAQ database. Our sample period 
ranges from January 1995 until the end of September 1999. The TAQ database 
includes intraday transactions data for all securities listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
the NASDAQ stock exchange. We dropped NASDAQ stocks from our sample 
because it is difficult to sign these trades (see Christie and Schultz, 1999). Intraday 
10 We owe special thanks to Richard Roll for having suggested this specification. 
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data are known to be prone to a number of anomalous records. Therefore, we use the 
same rules as in Chordia et al. (2002) to filter out the data. We excluded trades: 
- with no price information, a negative price or a price superior to $999; 
- with no quantity; 
- recorded before or after the closing time.11
For the quotes, we deleted records: 
- with negative bid-ask spread; 
- with negative quoted depth; 
- established before or after the closing time. 
At this stage, from an initial sample of 329,705,317 quotes and 208,732,464 trades, 
we obtain 329,687,111 and 208,472,712 filtered quotes and trades, respectively.
The next step is the determination of the number of buys and sells for each day and 
each stock, which are essential to compute the imbalance data. We use the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm to infer trade direction. This algorithm classifies a particular 
trade as buyer- (seller-) initiated if its price is larger (smaller) than the prevailing mid-
quote (average between the ask and the bid prices), and a trade at the mid-quote is 
classified as a buyer- (seller-) initiated if the last price change prior to the trade is 
positive (negative). 
2.2. Legal insider trading data 
11 The last trade is assumed to occur no later than 4:05 pm since transactions are commonly reported up 
to five minutes after the official close, 4:00 pm. 
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We used the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Ownership Reporting 
System (ORS) data files to extract corporate insider purchases and sales. These data 
comes from First Call/Thomson Financial Insider Research Services Historical Files. 
The ORS systems contain records of security transactions by people with beneficial 
ownership of securities, primarily officers, directors and principal stockholders of a 
corporation. We kept only SEC Form 4 data from the ORS database, which 
corresponds to the statement of changes in beneficial ownership of securities. For 
intraday stock data availability reasons, the sample period studied spans from January 
1995 to the end of September 1999. We kept only open market and private 
transactions and we excluded the ones with less than 100 shares to focus only on the 
more meaningful events. Therefore, the initial sample encompasses 113,506 insider 
transactions over the period examined. Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), we 
applied filter rules to eliminate the following records: duplicated, amended, with no 
price information, with a recorded date preceding the transaction date, with a recorded 
date occurring 31 days (or more) after the due date. As a last filter, we cross-checked 
the ORS price and volume information against that reported by the TAQ database. 
Therefore, we dropped from the sample records with a price not within the range of 
prices of that day, and with a volume exceeding the number of shares exchanged on 
that day. The application of these filters results in a sample of 109,847 insider trades.  
To define our event days (days for which we have an insider purchase or an insider 
sale) we use the same methodology as in Fidrmuc et al. (2006), which consists of 
taking the net transaction for days for which we have more than one transaction (e.g., 
a purchase of 300 shares and a sale of 150 shares on a given day become a net 
purchase of 150 shares for that day, and a purchase of 300 shares and a sale of 400 
shares become a net sale of 100 shares). Following this adjustment, our sample covers 
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59,244 daily aggregated insider trades in 2,110 firms. The number of insider purchase 
and sale days is 20,023 and 39,221 respectively. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution per month of the average proportion of the aggregated 
insider net purchases and net sales. The proportion of insider purchases (sales) for a 
given month is computed with respect to the total insider purchases (sales) of the 
corresponding year. Panel A considers the number of insider trades and Panel B the 
volume in dollar. These two panels put forward some seasonality pattern. Insider 
trades (both purchases and sales) seem to be more concentrated at the end of the year. 
Moreover, insider purchases and their sales seem to share a common seasonality. 
2.3. Summary statistics, abnormal returns and market conditions 
Summary statistics. Table 1 reports summary statistics of insider trading activities for 
all NYSE/AMEX common shares between January 1995 and September 1999. Panel 
A focuses on insider net purchases. The average number of insider net purchase days 
is 9 per company. The average company subject to an insider purchase has a market 
value of circa USD 2.6 billion. The average number of shares purchased is 14,612 
shares per event, the median being 2,270 shares. In dollar value, the average net 
purchase transaction amounts to USD 298,350, the size of the median transaction 
being USD 44,820. Similarly, we report in Panel B the same statistics for the insider 
net sales. The trading volume is more important for the sale. Insiders seem to be more 
seller than buyer, and insider sale activities tend to be concentrated on larger firms 
compared to insider buy activities. This confirms with the results provided by Jenter 
(2005).
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In order to analyze the relative size of the insider transactions, we have computed two 
ratios: the first one is the ratio of the net insider purchase to the volume of the 
corresponding day (Percent Volume), and the second one is the ratio of the net insider 
purchase to the market capitalization of the corresponding day (Percent Mkt Cap).
The average insider net purchase accounts for 12.35 percent of the daily transacted 
volume, and the median for 3.60 percent. Relative to market capitalization, the ratio 
ranges from 0 percent to 3.12 percent. In terms of relative size, insider sales and 
purchases are comparable. 
With respect to the trades reporting time to the SEC by the insiders, Table 1 shows 
two important statistics. These are the disclosure and resting times. The disclosure 
time is the time difference in number of days between the time at which the 
transaction is reported to the SEC and the trading time. The average reporting delay is 
22.11 and 22.75 days in our sample for the purchases and the sales, respectively. 
Table 1 shows also the resting time, which is the time in terms of number of days 
between the theoretical due date and the recorded time. The median of the resting time 
is 1 day, and the first quartile is 0, both for purchases and sales. Thus, 25 percent of 
the insider trades were reported with a delay of maximum 30 days. Seventy-five 
percent of our sample insiders tend to report before the due date.
Market reactions. In this part, we replicate Lakonishok and Lee (2001) event study 
results to check whether we are in the same empirical context. Table 2 displays the 
market reaction to insider net purchases and sales around the transaction dates. We 
compute the daily abnormal returns using a Beta-one model, which consists of 
subtracting the daily market portfolio return from the daily return of each company. 
We use the daily equally weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market portfolio. 
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We calculate both two-day (CAR0,1) and five-day (CAR0,4) average cumulative 
abnormal returns by taking the average of the abnormal returns for each insider 
transaction.
For the entire sample, the two-day (five-day) abnormal returns are 0.144 (0.417) and 
0.278 (0.225) percent for net purchases and net sales, respectively. The two-day 
average CAR for the purchases is lower than the one for the sales. However, once we 
increase the length of the event window, the average CAR on insider net sale days is 
smaller compared to the average CAR on insider net buy days. We have also provided 
the average CAR as a function of the trade size. As expected, the market impact 
appears to increase with trade size. Although these abnormal returns are statistically 
significant at conventional levels, they represent a weak response economically to 
insider trades, results consistent with the ones reported by Lakonishok and Lee 
(2001).
It is quite puzzling to observe also positive abnormal returns for insider sales. We see 
at least four possible explanations for this result: (1) in comparison to buys, insider 
sells are more likely to be driven by other motives (e.g., such as diversification and 
liquidity reasons) than private information (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et
al., 2003; Fidrmuc et al., 2006); (2) this result suggests also that insiders seem to sell 
stock when the market is dominated by the buy side, probably due to a positive public 
announcements. Indeed, Huddart et al. (forthcoming Journal of Accounting and 
Economics) document that insiders sell after good news earnings announcements. The 
last two potential explanations have already been mentioned in the introduction: (3) 
insiders have some market timing ability (Jenter, 2005; Piotroski and Roulstone, 
2005); (4) the CAR is not a good proxy to capture information asymmetry.  
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Market conditions. Table 3 displays simple and intuitive measures to compare market 
conditions between days of insider trades (IT) and the other days (NoIT), using both 
intraday transaction and quote data. The variables are first measured for each stock 
and for each day. Once we have our daily observations, we compute the percentage 
difference using the following procedure. We compute the average of the considered 
variable over IT-day ( ITiX ) and NoIT-day ( NoITiX ). We then take their difference, and 
divide it by the average on NoIT-day. This gives us a percentage abnormal change in 
price due to insider trading for each of our sample stock over the studied period. To 
get the average percentage difference (‘percentage-difference’), we average it across 
our sample stocks according to the following equation:
?
?
?
??
N
i
NoIT
i
NoIT
i
IT
i
X
XX
N
differencepercentage
1
1 ,    (4) 
where N denotes the number of firms in the sample. Table 3 provides also the ‘p-
value’ to check whether the ‘percentage-difference’ is statistically different from 0. 
The variables (Xi) are either daily average (e.g., ‘price’, ‘percentage quoted spread’)
or daily accumulation (e.g., ‘trade volume’, ‘quantity volume’).
Though having significant positive abnormal returns, the price is on average lower on 
insider net purchase days and higher on insider net sale days, in comparison to other 
days. With respect to volume, insider purchase days are days with higher volume, 
both in terms of trade and share exchanged. However, on insider net sale days the 
trade and quantity volume is lower, and not statistically different from the other days 
in dollar value. These results are consistent with the recent findings provided by 
Jenter (2005) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2005) suggesting insiders’ market timing 
ability.
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The percentage quoted spread widens on insider purchase days. This contrasts to some 
extent with the results provided by Chung and Charoenwong (1998). According to 
their analysis, market makers establish larger spreads for stocks with a greater extent 
of insider trading, but they find no evidence of spread changes on insider trading days. 
The percentage quoted spread narrows on insider sale days. Combined with the result 
reported in the previous sub-section on the CAR, the contraction of the spread on 
insider sale days could suggest the reduction of the information asymmetry on the 
market, likely due to public announcements. In fact, Huddart et al. (forthcoming 
Journal of Accounting and Economics) document that insider trades tend to cluster on 
days after earning announcements, and Chae (2006) shows that volume is higher and 
measures of information asymmetry are lower after earning announcements.  
The impact of insider trades on market depth goes in the opposite direction. Our depth 
measures are greater on insider purchase days and lower on insider sale days. To gain 
a better understanding of the impact of insider trading on market liquidity, we used 
the ‘composite liquidity’ measure proposed by Chordia et al. (2001), which 
corresponds to the ratio between the ‘percentage quoted spread’ and the ‘dollar
depth’. This measure suggests a negative impact of insider net purchases and a 
positive impact of insider net sales on market liquidity. For the purchase days, the 
increase in the spread is not compensated by an increase in the depth, and for the 
sales, a decrease in the spread is not vanished by a decrease in the depth. 
Consequently, insider purchase days are days with low liquidity, and insider sale days 
are days with high liquidity. Insiders on the buy side consume market liquidity. In 
exchange for absorbing liquidity on the market with their purchases, do insiders 
contribute to market efficiency by hastening price discovery? On the sell side, our 
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result suggests that insiders provide market liquidity, which is in itself a contribution 
to the efficiency of the financial system. 
Table 3 compares also trade imbalance measures on days involving insider trades with 
that on the other days. It is important to note that, both for the insider purchase days 
and sale days, the ROIB and the volume ROIB are not statistically different from the 
other days.12 Based on these two measures, insider trades do not modify on average 
the trade imbalance, but what about the sensitivity of the return to the trade 
imbalance? This question is explored in the next section. 
3. Results 
3.1. Are insider trades informative?
The analysis of the abnormal returns in the previous section showed that financial 
markets offer a week response to insider purchases, and the response has not the 
expected sign for insider sales. Moreover, insiders do not modify significantly the 
trade imbalance with their transactions. Now, we turn to the analysis of the sensitivity 
of the return to the order imbalance on insider purchase and sale days using Equation 
(3). Remember that if we expect insider trades to convey valuable information about 
future prices, we must observe increasing price sensitivity on insider trading days. 
According to Equation (3), this corresponds to a significant positive (negative) ?BUY
(?SELL). Table 4 shows the fixed effect panel regression estimation of this equation. 
The dependent variable is the daily return over time. 
12 The results given by the value ROIB is quite puzzling but seems to be driven by some extreme 
values. 
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Price sensitivity change due to insider trades. Model 1 provides an analysis of the 
price sensitivity change induced by insider trades. The independent variables are the 
signed relative order imbalance (ROIB), the cross product between the absolute ROIB
and the ratio of insider net purchases on a given day to the total volume of that day 
(‘insider buy’), and the cross product between the absolute ROIB and the ratio of 
insider net sales on a given day to the total volume of that day (‘insider sell’). The 
coefficients of these two cross-product variables measure the abnormal price 
sensitivity change induced by insider purchases and sales, respectively. They 
correspond to the coefficients ?BUY and ?SELL of Equation 3. The coefficient of ROIB is 
0.02410 and statistically significant, which shows that a positive imbalance (number 
of buys > number of sells) impacts positively the return. The coefficient of ‘?ROIB?
x insider buy’ is also positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the 
sensitivity of the return to trade imbalance on insider purchase days is higher than the 
sensitivity in other days, which is a clear indication of information incorporation into 
prices. The coefficient of ‘?ROIB? x Insider Sell’ is not significant, and does not 
have the expected sign. This result suggests that insider sales are either not 
information-based on average or the investors (and/or the market makers) are not able 
to figure out their presence in the market. 
Price sensitivity change due to insider abnormal trades. Since their physical and 
human capital is invested disproportionately in their company (e.g., Hall and Murphy, 
2002; Becker, 2006), insiders are known to be structurally more sellers than buyers of 
their own company stocks, mainly for diversification and liquidity reason (e.g., 
Lakonishok and Lee, 2001, Iqbal and Shetty, 2002; Jenter, 2005). In order to isolate 
the effect of information-based insider trading on price sensitivity we need to control 
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for managers’ incentives to diversify. To estimate the normal level of insider trading, 
we regress the percentage of insider net purchases (and net sales) on a set of 
determinants (as in Jenter (2005)), and the insider abnormal purchases (sales) 
correspond to the unexplained part of the regression. The considered determinants for 
the regressions are such as follows: total return over the last 12 months (corporate
insiders are more likely to rebalance their portfolios after large price changes), market
capitalization (insiders in large firms are more likely to sell company shares than 
insiders in small firms), total stock return volatility over the last 12 months
(Meulbroek (2000) shows that managers in more risky companies tend to sell equity 
more aggressively). We control also for changing firm risk using the volatility change 
between two successive 6-month periods previous to the considered insider trade. 
These first step regressions (for both purchases and sales) have significant Fisher 
statistics, with all the estimated coefficients statistically significant.13
The estimation of Equation 3 using insider abnormal trades is given in the column 
corresponding to Model 2 in Table 4. In order to have robust standard errors, the 
regressions have been estimated using GMM estimator. Once we control for trades 
likely realized for diversification reason, both insider purchases and sales are 
hastening significantly price discovery. The coefficient of ‘?ROIB?x insider 
abnormal sell’ is -0.02361. It has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant suggesting that the returns on insider sale days are more sensitive to order 
imbalance of other traders. If the imbalance is negative on insider sale days, their 
trading amplifies the impounding of the order imbalance into the (negative) returns. If 
the imbalance is positive, insider sale trades attenuate the buy order imbalances of 
13 For the ease of the exposition, these first step regressions are not displayed in Table 4.  
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others. This is a clear indication that insiders allow information incorporation into 
prices by their abnormal selling activities.
Model 3 and Model 4 extend the specification of Model 2 by controlling also for 
market conditions on insider trading days. Indeed, according to Table 3, insider 
trading days have market conditions in terms of volume or liquidity different from 
‘other’ days. Ignoring these aspects in the specification could lead to the conclusion of 
increasing price sensitivity while it could be a consequence of a difference in terms of 
liquidity for example. Model 3 shows that once we control for the volume of the 
trading day (in percentage of the total number of shares outstanding), and the liquidity 
(measured as in Table 3 by the ratio between the ‘percentage quoted spread’ and the 
‘dollar depth’), the coefficients of interest remain significant. Our results seem not to 
be driven by market conditions prevailing on insider trading days. Note that the 
control variables in Model 3 and Model 4 have the expected sign with respected to the 
liquidity measures. The lower is the market liquidity, the higher the sensitivity of the 
return to the order imbalance, and the higher (lower) is the spread (depth), the higher 
is the sensitivity of the return to the order imbalance.
Overall, our results suggest that insider (abnormal) trading allows faster price 
discovery.
Price sensitivity on reporting days. Table 5 shows the analysis on the reporting days. 
The official reporting day does not always correspond to the day on which the 
reporting is made public. There is a time delay of a few days, which varies from case 
to case (Chang and Suk, 1998). This is the reason why we have also analyzed the days 
subsequent to the reporting day. We estimate the same panel regression model. 
Besides of identifying days of insider trading, we have also identified days of 
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reporting. The variable ‘Reporting0_buy’ (‘Reporting0_sell’) takes the value of the 
aggregated insider net purchases (sales) expressed in percentage of the daily trading 
volume on the reporting day and 0 otherwise. The following three subsequent days to 
the reporting day are identified by ‘Reporting1’, ‘Reporting2’ and ‘Reporting3’,
respectively. 
The results provided in Table 5 suggest that information is significantly incorporated 
into prices on the reporting day of an aggregated insider net purchase. The coefficient 
associated with the cross product variable ‘ ROIB x Reporting0_buy’ is positive 
(0.00084) and statistically significant. This result underlines the importance of the 
reporting imposed by regulation, because this activity also allows additional 
information to be incorporated into asset prices. The change in the return sensitivity to 
an order imbalance due to the reporting of insider purchases is also significant two 
days after the recording days and even much stronger. For the reporting of aggregated 
net insider sales, additional information seems to be impounded the day after the 
reporting.
3.2. Robustness checks 
This sub-section is devoted to some robustness analyses. First, we want to be sure that 
our result is not due to chance. Then, we consider the insider trades in dollar. We also 
perform the same empirical analysis using two alternative measurements of ROIB.
Furthermore, we remove from our insider events, days for which the insider abnormal 
purchases (sales) are lower than the first decile, and greater than the ninth decile. 
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Are our results due to chance? We implement a model-based bootstrap (MbM) 
scheme to test whether our result is due to chance (see Davison and Hinkley, 1997). 
The used bootstrap scheme is as follows:
1. We first estimate Equation (3) without taking into account the cross product 
variable between the ROIB and insider net abnormal purchases and sales: 
i,ttiiti ?ROIBR ??? ,, ?? ;
2. We then compute for each stock the residual of the estimated model (ei,t) such 
as ;) ˆˆ(ˆ ,,, tiititi ROIBRe ?? ???
3. For each stock, we randomly draw a residual from the corresponding previous 
series, and then we recompose the initial return series by adding the drawn 
residual (ê*i,t) to the estimated return: ;titiiti eROIBR ,,, *ˆ) ˆˆ(*ˆ ??? ??
4. With our new return series we re-estimate the model presented in Equation (3). 
5. We save the heteroscedastic consistent t-statistic; 
6. Step 3 to 5 is repeated 1,000 times.   
In this way, we get a simulated distribution for the t-statistics under the null 
hypothesis of non-contribution of insider trading to market efficiency. If our result is 
not due to chance, we expect the t-statistics of the coefficients ?BUY and ?SELL to be 
greater than those obtained through the MbB simulations at conventional levels. Table 
6 Panel A gives the number of times the simulated t-statistics is superior to our 
original t-statistics. We provide also the number of times the simulated p-value is 
lesser or equal to 0.05. These results clearly show the robustness of our finding 
according to which insider abnormal purchase and sale days permit faster price 
discovery.
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Insider trades in dollar. Panel B displays the estimation of Model 2 in Table 4 using 
insider abnormal dollar trades instead of number of shares. The use of the dollar volume 
does not modify the results presented in Table 4.  
Trade ROIB versus volume and dollar ROIB. We have replicated Model 2 of Table 4 
using alternative measures for ROIB. Table 6 Panel C provides the estimation of 
Equation (3) using the quantity ROIB and the dollar ROIB. We get almost the same 
result.
Censoring insider trades. To check whether our results are not driven by insider 
larger trades, we remove from the insider episodes, days for which the insider 
abnormal purchases (sales) are lower than the first decile, and greater than the ninth 
decile. The change in the return sensitivity to order imbalance due to purchases (sales) 
remains significant and with the expected sign, suggesting that it is not a small sub-set 
of large trades that contain private information. 
4. Conclusion 
So far, empirical evidence supporting the contribution of insiders to information 
efficiency is limited. Works relying on short-term abnormal returns are at best 
ambiguous, being potentially hampered by endogeneity problem and insiders’ 
strategic behavior, and show only limited impacts. The long-term abnormal 
performance of insiders’ portfolios may simply be due to the public release of 
information in the months following insider trades.  
The contribution of this paper stems from the methodology we applied. Using insights 
from the recent microstructure literature, we studied, in a panel data analysis setting, 
the change in sensitivity of the return to the relative order imbalance induced by 
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insider trading. The modest data requirements of our approach allowed us to deal with 
a really large sample of 59,244 daily aggregated insider trades in 2,110 firms quoted 
on either the NYSE or the AMEX during the period 1995-1999.
Our results are unambiguous and robust with respect to several definitions of the 
relative order imbalance: insiders do significantly contribute to faster price discovery 
on insider trading days; and disclosure requirements also contribute (but to a lesser 
extent) to market efficiency. The necessary condition for allowing regulated insider 
trading is fulfilled. Is this contribution sufficient given the price paid by uninformed 
agents? This is an open ethical question. 
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Figure 1. Abnormal price sensitivity to relative order imbalance 
This figure displays the expected abnormal price sensitivity to relative order imbalance due to insider 
trading. The X-axis and Y-axis represent the relative order imbalance (ROIB) and the return (R) for 
stock i, respectively. Panel A (Panel B) depicts the case where a positive (negative) return is 
associated with a positive (negative) ROIB. The coefficient ? measures the normal level of the 
price sensitivity to the ROIB. The coefficients ?BUY and ?SELL capture the abnormal change in 
the sensitivity induced by insider buy and sell transactions, respectively.
Panel A. R>0 and ROIB>O 
ROIBi
Ri
?
?+?BUY
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Panel B. R<0 and ROIB<0 
Figure 2. Insider trades aggregated per month 
This figure displays the evolution of the average proportion of the aggregated insider net purchases 
and net sales per month. The X-axis represents the month of the year. Panel A and Panel B 
consider the number of insider trades and the volume in dollar, respectively.
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Table 2. Market reactions to insider trading activities 
This table reports average cumulative abnormal returns in percentage around insider net 
purchases and insider net sells for all companies in the sample. Panel A deals with the all 
sample, and Panel B provides a split of the sample by trade size. Qx denotes the quartile x
reported in Table 1, and CAR0,1 (CAR0,4) corresponds to the average of the cumulated 
abnormal return between day 0 and day +1 (+4) relative to the transaction date. As in 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), we calculate daily abnormal returns by subtracting the equally 
weighted CRSP index daily return from the daily return of a firm’s stock.  
Net purchases Net sells 
CAR0,1 CAR0,4 CAR0,1 CAR0,4
Panel A. All sample  
Abnormal returns 0.144 0.417 0.278 0.225 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Panel B. Split by trade size 
Trade Value <= Q1 
Abnormal returns 0.023 0.187 0.104 0.021 
p-value 0.729 0.033 0.009 0.718 
Q1 < Trade Value <= Q2 
Abnormal returns 0.200 0.522 0.274 0.214 
p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q2 < Trade Value <= Q3
Abnormal returns 0.130 0.524 0.325 0.333 
p-value 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q3 < Trade Value
Abnormal returns 0.225 0.435 0.411 0.331 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5. Insider reporting days and price sensitivity change to relative order imbalance 
This table provides fixed effect panel regression estimation of Equation (3) where we have 
also identified insider reporting days (‘Reporting0’) and the successive days. The variable 
‘Reporting0_buy’ (‘Reporting0_sell’) takes the value of the aggregated insider net 
purchases (sales) expressed in percentage of the daily trading volume on the reporting 
day and 0 otherwise. The following three subsequent days to the reporting day are 
identified by ‘Reporting1’, ‘Reporting2’ and ‘Reporting3’, respectively. In order to 
have robust standard errors, the regressions have been estimated using GMM estimator. N
denotes the number of observations entering into the panel estimation. 
Independent variables Coefficient P-value
ROIB 0.02410 0.00
?ROIB?x insider abnormal buy 0.01666 0.00
?ROIB? x Insider abnormal sell -0.02357 0.00
?ROIB?x Reporting0_buy 0.00084 0.03
?ROIB?x Reporting1_buy 0.00021 0.26
?ROIB?x Reporting2_buy 0.00203 0.00
?ROIB?x Reporting3_buy 0.00053 0.22
?ROIB?x Reporting0_sell 0.00008 0.85
?ROIB?x Reporting1_sell -0.00096 0.05
?ROIB?x Reporting2_sell -0.00038 0.40
?ROIB?x Reporting3_sell -0.00025 0.63
Fisher Test 17,573 0.00
N 2,042,438 
Adjusted R² 0.086 
Table 6. Robustness checks 
Panel A shows the results obtained through a model-based bootstrap (MbB) approach to 
check whether our result is not due to chance. TBUY corresponds to the t-statistic of the 
coefficient ?BUY in Equation 3. TMbB corresponds to the t-statistic of the same coefficient 
obtained through the MbB procedure, at each iteration. Panel B displays the estimation of 
Model 2 in Table 4 using insider abnormal dollar trades instead of number of shares. Panel C 
replicates also Model 2 in Table 4 using volume ROIB and dollar ROIB, instead of trade 
ROIB. Panel D considers only insider abnormal trades within the first and last decile. 
B
Panel A. Are our results due to chance? 
Count Proportion
Abnormal insider purchase 
TMbB > TBUY 0 0.00% 
p-valueMbB < 0.05 48 4.80% 
Abnormal insider sell 
TMbB > TBUY 0 0.00% 
p-valueMbB < 0.05 59 5,91% 
Number of simulation 1,000 
Panel B. Insider trades in dollar 
Independent variables Coefficient P-value
ROIB 0.02410 0.00 
?ROIB?x $ insider abnormal buy 0.01511 0.00 
?ROIB?x $ insider abnormal sell -0.02506 0.00 
Fisher Test 64,433 0.00 
N 2,042,438 
Adjusted R² 0.086 
Panel C. Volume and dollar ROIB 
Volume ROIB Dollar ROIB 
Independent variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
ROIB 0.01864 0.00 0.01864 0.00 
?ROIB?x insider abnormal buy 0.00864 0.00 0.00860 0.00 
?ROIB?x insider abnormal sell -0.01116 0.00 -0.01120 0.00 
Fisher Test 74,162 0.00 74,186 0.00 
N 2,196,212 2,196,212 
Adjusted R² 0,098 0.098 
Panel D. Censoring the data 
Independent variables Coefficient P-value
ROIB 0.02452 0.00 
?ROIB?x insider abnormal buy 0.02415 0.00 
?ROIB?x  insider abnormal sell -0.08874 0.00 
Fisher Test 61,197 0.00 
N 1,899,108 
Adjusted R² 0.088 
